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At the centre of the conundrum that is the British constitution is the House of Lords, reform 
of which is once again being discussed by Parliament, though conspicuously not by the public.  
The enduring mystification inherent in the subject is clear from first principles: the upper 
chamber is in practice the lower chamber.  Since the 1911 Parliament Act the House of 
Commons has been superior to the House of Lords.  1911 was however also the last major 
reform; that it was also the first major reform is not a coincidence.  The 1911 Act mattered 
greatly, as hitherto an unelected chamber could thwart the will of that which had been elected.  
With that clear democratic outrage removed, there was no consensus over subsequent reform: 
though the Act conveyed the intention “to substitute for the House of Lords as it at present 
exists a Second Chamber constituted on a popular instead of a hereditary basis”, with some 
perspicacity it went on that “such substitution cannot be immediately brought into operation”.  
Thus, one hundred years on, with no public interest, therefore no partisan political benefits, 
and so in turn no momentum, the situation remains. 
 
There have been many attempts at reform.  Of those that succeeded, the most important were 
the 1958 Life Peerages Act, which provided for the creation of life peers (and so for the 
admittance of women for the first time), and the 1999 House of Lords Act, which reduced the 
number of hereditary peers from 747 to 92.  The 1999 Act was typical: the product of 
compromise in the absence of consensus, avowedly only part of a process, but still greatly 
controversial to those actually exercised over the issue.  It began a process which continued to 
a Royal Commission and the Wakeham Report of 2000, which led to public consultation that 
produced no consensus, and hundreds of different opinions, before a Joint Committee of both 
houses offered parliamentarians seven options, ranging from a wholly-appointed, to a wholly-
elected house.  None of the options gained a majority.  A Department for Constitutional 
Affairs was established in 2003, demonstrating that whatever else it was, the Blair 
governments were certainly the most radical in relation to constitutional change since those of 
Asquith before the First World War.  The new Department managed reform of the judiciary, 
but Lords reform again foundered on the absence of any agreement, or, indeed, any will. 
 
The latest initiative comes amidst an unprecedented period of constitutional upheaval, as 
Nick Clegg, Deputy Prime Minister, one hundred years after Asquith – one of his predecessors 
as Liberal leader – sought to use the unexpected and probably fleeting opportunity of a 
presence in government permanently to modernise the constitution.  The first reform, and the 
most pluralistic, has already been lost, in a referendum in May 2011: electoral reform.   The 
embarrassment of that defeat at least gave face-saving momentum for Clegg to pursue Lords 
reform; to demonstrate the progressive constitutional vitality of at least the Liberal Democrat 
part of the Coalition.  Another of Clegg’s predecessors, David Steel (a life  peer since 1997) has 
suggested a bill to break the deadlock, which would replace 1958’s unaccountable system of 
patronage with a Statutory Appointments Commission, create a system of retirement (peers 
are peers unto death), the ability to remove peers guilty of serious transgressions, and, by 
ending the system of by-elections when hereditary peers die, and converting the existing 
hereditaries into Life Peers, finally remove heredity from Britain’s legislature (though not of 
course from the constitution).   
 
Even if Steel’s suggested bill were eventually passed, the essential issues of the second 
chamber would remain unresolved: whether it should be elected or appointed, or a mixture of 
the two, and if so on what proportions.  Some maintain that no legislator should be anything 
but elected; others hold that an elected Lords might effectively reverse or at least rebalance 
the 1911 settlement and claim democratic legitimacy over the Commons, or at the very least 
confuse matters.  Then there is the nature of the members of the Lords themselves: if elected, 
the problems of party politics may be reproduced in a chamber currently characterised by its 
relative distinctiveness from (increasingly unpopular) machine politicians, whilst also in all 
likelihood doing away with the accumulated years of experience in all areas of national life 
that the present 789 peers can call on when scrutinising legislation, peers who would be 
unlikely to want to stand the rigours of campaigning if they were required to be elected.  If 
members were appointed, who should appoint?  There appears at least to be a consensus that 
a hybrid system – of election and appointment – should be introduced, but no agreement 
whatever as to the proportions has been, or is likely ever to be, reached.   More fundamentally 
one could indeed ask whether there needs to be a second chamber at all.  Such debates have 
taken place, and continue, in the face of widespread public indifference. 
 
Public indifference, however, is not a reason to do nothing about an issue; it is however the 
most specious of the claims by those resisting any change, just as it was to those opposing 
electoral reform.  Nor should one refrain from stating that elites are not inherently 
undesirable if those elites are open, any more than that voting does not necessarily equal 
democracy: a democratic second chamber therefore need not be elected.  Those who argue 
that every legislator has to have been elected or else is it not democratic may be called 
democratic dogmatists, implying as they must do that the Commons is a model of the form, 
and overlooking that the Lords have consistently displayed independence of mind based on 
wider life experience, and a consequent freedom and independence of mind.  Lords reform is 
not any more a matter of left and right, as the unholy alliance of Michael Foot and Enoch 
Powell demonstrated when it derailed another doomed effort, in 1968.  Indeed, the most 
recent impetus for ‘democratising’ the Lords has come from the right of the Conservative 
Party, after the Lords defeated two ‘democratising’ bills of the present government for elected 
police chiefs and for a ‘referendum lock’ before ratifying future European treaties, measures 
for which the term “democratic dogmatism” could have been invented. 
 
A minority, easily derided, support a wholly-appointed chamber, to preserve the best of the 
old, and with the creation of a transparent, inclusive, and rigorous, appointments 
commission, and a correlational retirement process, introduce the best of the new.  The Steel 
‘bill’ is as close to such a reform as has been mooted, though it fulfils the wishes neither of 
Asquith nor Clegg.  Unlike the monarch, another component of the conundrum, which has in 
common with the Lords the probability that it would not exist in any constitution that had 
actually been created rather than had merely evolved, the Lords holds no public attention one 
way or the other.  Unlike the winning campaign in the referendum on electoral reform, 
however, it will not be subject to ‘democracy’ in its purest form: a direct poll of that minority 
of the electorate that could be bothered to vote after a campaign disfigured by far from 
impartial and heavily funded publicity and press coverage.  So, in the absence of ‘democracy’, 
and even the failure of the Steel bill, the upper chamber seems likely, in its anachronistic way, 
to continue to exercise scrutiny and restraint on the lower chamber, reform of which is long 
overdue. 
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